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PUBLIC SERVICE PERFORMANCE AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT: THE 
PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY 
 
 
Concerns for restoring citizens’ trust in government are at the core of public sector 
modernization. Public distrust is often blamed on the bad functioning of public 
services, and in political discourse well-functioning public services are said to create 
trust in government. This is a very rational and mechanistic reasoning, only part of 
which corresponds to reality. The link between performance and trust can only be 
made when very specific conditions are present. The core of the discussion deals 
with causality: it is obvious that performance of the public administration has a certain 
impact on trust in government, but existing levels of trust in government may also 
have an impact on perceptions of government performance. In this article, we outline 
a framework for research on this performance-trust relation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Concern with low levels of trust in government and the negative image of government 
and the public administration has stimulated Western governments to engage in a 
modernisation strategy for their public service [1]. The implicit hypothesis on which 
this strategy is built is that better performing public services will lead to increased 
satisfaction among their users, and this, in turn, will lead to more trust in government. 
The hypothesis, in other words, is that people do not trust government because 
administrations do not work properly. This hypothesis contains a number of flaws and 
is only valid within a certain context. In this article, we want to offer a framework 
within which the relation between public sector performance and citizens’ attitudes 
towards government (call these trust, support, perceptions, or whatever you like) can 
be investigated. The most important aspect dealt with in this article will be the causal 
relation in this reasoning: do citizens have a negative perception of government 
because its services do not work properly, or do citizens evaluate government 
administrations and their performance in a negative way, because their image of 
government in general is a negative one? 
 
In customer satisfaction surveying, which is steadily gaining ground in government, it 
is often forgotten that other factors than service quality also determine user 
satisfaction. Performance of public administrations and satisfaction of its users are 
thus not necessarily related, because of the subtle interplay of reality, perception and 
expectations. This leads us to believe that another implicit causal relation in 
modernisation and reinvention rhetoric, the relation between satisfaction with service 
delivery and trust in government, is even more dubious, especially when we stick to 
approaching government as a mere summation of agencies. We thus have to answer 
a number of questions: do perceptions of government agencies –agencies delivering 
services more specifically- influence perceptions of government, and if they do, is the 
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impact of every single agency comparable, or are certain agencies more dominant? 
Are these agencies the only influences on government perception? Is the causal 
relation a correct one, or does it work in the opposite way? Or is there no relation at 
all?  
 
Before starting, we would like to mention that we will approach performance in a very 
general way, as to avoid terminological discussions. Due to the nature of government 
performance, output and process are often intertwined. Services are produced and 
consumed at the same time, making a distinction between output and process 
aspects in practice impossible. Therefore, we will use the term performance as 
encompassing both process and output/outcome. Trust is an often-used term in 
political discourse, which has lead to an inflation of its use. Terms such as trust, 
confidence, perception and image of government are often used interchangeably as 
catchall terms. What we are interested in is not trust in the restricted meaning it has 
in philosophical works, but general attitudes towards government, perceptions of 
government and the like. When we use trust, it are these attitudes we refer to, since 
trust has through intensive use in political discourse obtained this meaning. 
 
CAUSALITY 
 
Research on trust in government often tries to find statistical relations between a 
series of socio-demographic and sociological variables and trust in government, but 
little is known about the processes of causation behind these relations. With regard 
to the topic of this article, the question whether it is low public service quality that 
leads to a unfavourable evaluations of government in general, or whether it is the 
negative attitude towards government in general that leads people to evaluate the 
quality of its public services in a negative way becomes more relevant. Can causality 
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actually work in both directions, or does it then concern two entirely different causal 
relations (at other levels)? It may be clear that in our field of research there are only 
few situations where we can find a counterfactual conditional relation: if X then Y. 
Instead we find situations where ‘if X, then Y’ is valid as well as ‘if not X, then also Y’ 
or ‘if X, then not necessarily Y’, and where this information does not allow us to 
conclude that a relation is absent. A good starting point could be to refer to the INUS 
conditions: is a condition necessary and sufficient? This INUS approach relies on 
contingent conditions which have to be present for X to have an impact on Y [2]. 
There has to be an Insufficient but Necessary part in a condition, which is in itself 
Unnecessary, but Sufficient. Together these form a full cause for something [3]. In 
the framework of this article, this means that it is not easy to have people trust 
government when public services do not function properly, while good functioning 
public services do not necessarily lead to trust in government. We want to know 
when this causality is functioning, and why this is or is not the case. Large-scale 
empirical research is necessary to determine whether there actually is a causal 
relation between public service performance and trust in government, or whether the 
causal relations are just based on beliefs.  
 
MICRO-PERFORMANCE THEORY 
 
Bad performance of government agencies is said to create negative attitudes 
towards government in general. Similarly, well-functioning public services are said to 
induce citizens to trust government [4;5]. This micro-performance theory, as we call 
this relation, relates variations in trust to changes in (the quality of, or the perception 
of) government service delivery [6-10]. 
 
This so-called micro-performance hypothesis contains the following reasoning:  
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<figure 1 here> 
 
Better quality performance is supposed to lead to satisfied citizens, and this in turn to 
more trust or a similar positive attitude towards government. At the same time better 
agency performance will be summed up and lead to better government performance. 
Government would then only exist as a summation of its constituting elements and 
has no separate identity: Government = police + courts + schools + parliament + 
ministries +....  
 
THE RELATION BETWEEN PUBLIC SERVICE PERFORMANCE AND TRUST IN 
GOVERNMENT: 5 ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
 
The micro-performance approach contains a large number of shortcomings and 
offers at best only a partial explanation of the relation between the quality of public 
service delivery and trust in government. We therefore have to clarify both the biases 
and the gaps in this approach. We will therefore develop a number of alternative 
models to explain this relation. It seems there are a number of strict preconditions for 
the micro-performance hypothesis to be valid. The first deal with objects of 
evaluation, the second with the evaluation criteria, and the third with the causality in 
the evaluation. 
• OBJECT: First there should be certainty and clarity on the objects of evaluation. 
Is the status of an organisation or agency clearly and undisputedly governmental, 
and perceived as such? If a public organisation is not perceived as being public, 
quality and performance improvement efforts will do little to improve trust in 
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government. We will discuss this aspect more in detail when dealing with model 
1. An alternative to this remark is what we call ‘dominant impact’: government 
should not be regarded as just a summation of all its constituting parts (agencies, 
institutions), but instead one or more core institutions determine citizens’ image of 
government. The basic hypothesis, the micro-performance theory, considers 
public services as such ‘core institutions’. Model 2 describes the impact of these 
core institutions more in detail. 
• CRITERIA: Second, the relation between agency performance and perceptions of 
government should be direct and linear. This means no other factors should be 
involved. Evaluations of performance are mediated by expectations about this 
performance. Furthermore, trust in government is not only a factor of its 
performance, but depends on the degree of identification with the government as 
well, and a series of sociological factors. The main question therefore is what 
impact the performance of public services has on the evaluation of government in 
general as compared to other factors. Do evaluations of public services have an 
important impact on citizen’s image of government or are they only marginal? 
Model 3 gives indications on the type of criteria that are used for evaluating 
government 
• CAUSALITY: Third, subjective performance perceptions should somehow 
correspond to (objective) reality. When introducing subjective measures, such as 
satisfaction or opinion surveys, there are always critics who are afraid that these 
subjective evaluations will not correspond to objective quality. Research shows 
that there is no ground for these worries [11-13]. Other research however is not 
so sure about this [14;15]. Here the main problem with the ‘micro-performance 
approach’ is situated. It takes a causality leading from performance to satisfaction 
to trust for granted, while it may well be that evaluations of the performance of 
public services are not based on the actual performance, but on a stereotypical 
view on how government is said to function. Causality is thus reversed: here 
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perceptions of government in general influence perceptions of its constituting 
public services, and not the other way round. This is what is described in model 
4. Model 5 then shows that the direction of this causality is context-specific, and 
that in fact we will often have to speak of multi-causality. 
 
Each of the models consists of a number of units: at the left side, there are a number 
of public agencies, and at the right side government in general. We consider three 
aspects in an agency: performance, user satisfaction and trust. These three aspects 
are also to be found in government as a whole: government performance, 
satisfaction with government performance and trust in government. Performance, 
satisfaction and trust are supposed to be related within a certain unit, but in some 
models the relations are non-existent or unclear, and relations within a unit may also 
be influenced by other units. The ‘P’ stands for perception. Presence of a ‘P’ 
indicates the existence of an independent perception, an influence external to 
performance of either the agencies or government in general.  
 
<figure 2 here> 
 
MODEL 1: DISCONNECTION 
 
Model 1 suggests that the perception of government agencies does not influence the 
perception of government as a whole and vice versa. Here we can distinguish two 
possibilities. One is that there is no influence of service satisfaction on trust in 
government because citizens make independent judgements of both government as 
a whole and of its individual agencies. It however seems improbable that the 
performance of these agencies has no influence at all on evaluations of government.  
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The other possibility is that some agencies are just not perceived as being part of 
government, or as being influenced by government. When we want to compare or 
evaluate data on perceptions of government, ‘government’ should have a well-
defined and stable meaning. It is not always clear what people see as ‘government’ 
or as public services. Are schools part of government? Or the post-office? The 
railways? A survey in the UK asked citizens which organisations they thought of as 
public services. 55 % mentioned Councils, 51% public transport, 29 % police, while 
only 13% spontaneously mentioned central government [16]. This could mean central 
government is conceptualised in political terms and not so much in administrative 
ones. Research by the European Commission in its Continuous Tracking Survey 
showed a number of important differences between European countries [17]. 
Differences in the judgement of telecommunications, radio and television, public 
transport etc. as being public or private can be explained by a different history of 
privatisation, political influence and the structure of the market. What is surprising 
however is that there are -be it small- cross-country differences between judgements 
of police, justice etc. as public services. 94 % of the Dutch consider the judicial 
system as a public service as compared to 85% of the French. The figure below 
gives some data on Belgian service providers: 
 
<figure 3 here> 
 
Such a question on what citizens see as government is important to discover what 
kind of agencies are considered as part of government, and can thus be supposed to 
have an influence on the perceptions of government. The public has increasing 
problems to distinguish public and private sector [18], and a lot of ‘errors of 
attribution’ therefore occur [8;19]. 
If a large part of a population does not consider e.g. the post office as a public 
service one could conclude that the evaluation of the functioning of and the general 
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attitude towards this post-office does not have an influence on the perception of 
government in general, though very often one would find a relation. In the USA, a 
listing of high impact agencies was developed, containing those government 
agencies that are supposed to have most impact (both by frequency of contact and 
visibility) on citizens. If this impact were decisive for the formation of the general 
perception of government, it would be possible to calculate for each institution 
separately what influence it has on the perception, but such an approach is probably 
too simple and negates many factors (see also model 2).  
 
Perceiving a certain government agency as part of government is one thing, 
attributing its bad performance to government another, even though both are often 
indistinguishable. An example were this is not always the case could for instance be 
the Central Bank: if economic prospects are bad, is this then due to the performance 
of the Central Bank or to external factors? Uslaner for instance finds a relation 
between the state of the economy and trust in government, but only when 
respondents thought government could actually exert influence on the state of the 
economy [20]. If citizens do not hold government or a public service responsible for 
something, it is unlikely this will influence evaluations. This ‘holding responsible’ 
should be distinguished from the question whether citizens think it is a government 
task to perform certain tasks. The macro-performance theory explains variations in 
trust across countries and over time as due to variations in unemployment rates, 
economic growth, inflation, the stability of governments etc. [21-26]. According to 
Huseby, this hypothesis is only valid when applied to issues on which there is a 
consensus that government should perform them, and people should see them as an 
important and not just as a secondary task of government [23]. Therefore, we could 
conclude that if there is no relation between satisfaction with the performance of 
public agencies and trust in government, this can be caused by the following factors. 
• The agency is not perceived as part of government 
 11
• The bad performance is thought of as not caused or influenced by the agency 
• There is total and unconditional consensus on the fact that government should 
perform the task, and bad performance is then regarded as an unavoidable 
consequence of this decision (e.g. government is restricted by a large number of 
preconditions in performing a certain task, which makes it cannot perform as 
effectively as in a situation where these preconditions would not be present) for 
which government should not be blamed (↔ citizens who think a task should not 
be done by government shall take a negative attitude whatever the performance) 
 
MODEL 2: DOMINANT IMPACT 
 
The micro-performance theory takes a rather mechanistic and rational approach to 
the process of how public service performance can lead to a more positive attitude 
towards government. All agencies should be summated, with a correction for the 
relative weight of the agency in society, for the importance citizens attach to the 
agency, and for the fact whether the agency is entirely seen as a public service or 
not. In model 2 we suggest that certain agencies can have a dominant impact on 
perceptions of government that is larger than could be justified by their role (size, 
budget, impact on people’s lives...). This process can be compared to the process of 
generalisation that we will describe when dealing with model 4. Until now, most 
research has focused on the impact of certain political bodies on the attitude towards 
government, so most examples will be taken from that body of research. We do not 
see many reasons why certain government administrations and agencies could not 
play a similar role, except perhaps the mythical and ideological aura that is 
surrounding certain political bodies that we do hardly find with regard to 
administrations.  
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A dominant impact of a single institutions or agency or of a small group of 
institutions/agencies on trust in government is not necessarily permanent. A number 
of factors determine which dominant institution can exist. There are cultural and 
symbolic factors such as the role of parliament in transition countries, which 
symbolises democracy, and we could refer to the role of strong leaders symbolising 
the nation, to the role of the army in periods of war, etc. Changes over time can occur 
due to certain events. In Belgium, a number of scandals suddenly made the court 
system and the food safety agencies dominant bodies in the perception of 
government, whereas this impact (certainly in the case of the food safety agencies) 
was much lower in the past. In the US, citizens’ attitudes towards public 
administration became much more positive because of the events on the 11th of 
September. It can be expected that in a period of scandals, the moral integrity of 
politicians becomes important as a factor for constituting one’s attitude towards 
government.  
Which factors, agencies or even policies become dominant is often a matter of 
(conscious or unconscious) choice. Beck gives the example of the commotion on 
(small-risk) nuclear plants, while traffic accidents have a bigger impact on society. 
The latter problem however has not been accepted as a major problem and has been 
defined away [27]. A malfunctioning environmental protection agency will probably 
not take an important place in the assessment of government when the police and 
justice system are unfair. Similarly, participation in decision-making only becomes 
important once there is security and material safety.  
Keywords in this model are visibility, events and scandals. Relying upon this model 
could make research difficult, since it could happen that the object of study (i.e. what 
do citizens see as government) is changing during the research. This model allows 
for bringing in a wide range of existing research on the impact of scandals on political 
trust. We should rely here on communication science. The main question is why 
certain events become widely publicised, and are thus supposed to have an 
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influence. This is not just a passive approach. It also has importance for government 
communication initiatives: what issues does crisis management have to focus on and 
how can it be arranged so that certain government activities, e.g. major reforms or 
quality initiatives are actually promoted to ‘dominant impacts’? 
 
As the above has tried to show, we can hardly consider these dominant influences as 
stable and permanent. In fact, the degree of political sophistication has something to 
do with it. Easton and Dennis wrote a book in 1969 on how (American) children see 
the political system [28]. Small children do not perceive government as one 
homogeneous institute, instead they already distinguish a number of bodies, and 
they are able to see differences between formal and would-be political authorities. 
They consider the president as very important, but older children regard authority 
institutions such as government or the Supreme Court as more important. The older 
they become, the more importance there is given to structures and impersonal 
institutions, and less to persons. They also found that even the young children did not 
refer to the president as the person, but as the institutionalised role. In this case, the 
president is a strong personalisation of power, which is not the case for e.g. a 
Representative, who is less able to personalise the legislative power of Congress.  
As for the United States, the President is sometimes seen as government in person, 
and this will have an influence on the image of government in general. President 
Reagan for instance managed to increase trust in government by emphasising 
ceremonial aspects of the presidency, such as symbols, the ‘grandeur’, the image of 
the president who stands above politics, … [29]. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse on the 
other hand, in their book Congress as Public Enemy, state that it is Congress which 
determines the (negative) attitude towards government in the USA because of its 
visibility: all debates, compromises and opposition are too visible. A 
conceptualisation of the commonly made general semantic connections in the public 
mind between the various parts of the national government showed members of 
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Congress as part of the (pejorative) ‘Washington system’, while the president, and 
certainly the members of the Supreme Court, were leaning towards the ‘constitutional 
system’ [30]. A similar point is made in research on the Canadian situation: feelings 
about parliament and assessments of MP’s have significant effect on levels of 
support for the national political community and regime, because parliament is the 
most salient and dramatic symbol of the representative character of politics [31]. 
Certain parts of government seem to take a more prominent place in people’s mind, 
but as the American examples show, it seems difficult to attribute the whole 
attitude/image to the effect of one institution.  
There is no reason why these images should not differ between countries and over 
time. Another question could be whether it are the institutions as such which have an 
impact, or that these just symbolise criteria used for judging government. In certain 
periods or areas, more or less importance is given to efficiency, legitimacy, 
participation etc. When the pendulum swings to participation, perhaps parliament 
weighs stronger, while the administration or strong leaders weigh stronger when 
importance is given to efficiency. The same could hold for process or output 
orientations in performance evaluations. 
 
MODEL 3: MULTIPLE INFLUENCES 
 
Performance of the constituting agencies of government is not the only factor 
influencing evaluations of government. Even when government does not perform 
independent from its agencies, there is no reason why citizens would not have an 
opinion on government itself. This independent perception of government becomes 
even more apparent when we not only consider performance-related evaluation 
criteria, but also identity-related ones. This brings us to a broadening of the factors 
influencing perception: not only administrative ones, but also political ones. Adding 
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these extra criteria does not necessarily contradict the micro-performance 
hypothesis; it only means that the micro-performance hypothesis is only able to 
explain part of the attitude towards government. It might well turn out that the impact 
of agencies’ performance evaluations is surprisingly small. 
  
The implicit causal link between user satisfaction and trust in government seems to 
be based on a merger of client and citizen roles. It is supposed that citizens will 
transfer their satisfaction in a by definition limited client-role to trust in government, 
which is a broader attitude engaging the citizen in all his/her roles (client, voter, tax-
payer, participant, stakeholder...). This corresponds to a move from the use of 
performance-related indicators to a mixed use of both performance- and identity-
related indicators. However, the reduction of government to an amalgamation of 
services in NPM approaches might suggest that there is no merger at all of roles. 
Instead, there are numerous criticisms on the reduction of citizens to clients as a 
result of modernisation exercises [32]. 
 
MODEL 4: REVERSED CAUSALITY 
 
We do not only want to know (micro-performance hypothesis) whether satisfaction 
with agencies’ performance leads to a more positive attitude towards government. 
We should also wonder why it would not be a general positive attitude towards 
government that leads to a more favourable evaluation of its agencies’ performance. 
This would for instance be the case in a state where a strong national identity is 
fostered (often created by dissociating oneself from an out-group), and where as a 
result none of the state-related agencies can do wrong in the citizen’s eyes. More 
realistic perhaps would be the existence of a generalised negative attitude towards 
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government –a culture of distrust [33]- that makes that all actions of government are 
evaluated in a negative way, just because it are government actions. 
The question of causality is thus the main one. When doing research, one should 
thus clearly state whether trust will be dealt with as a dependent or independent 
variable, since trust can be both cause and effect [34]. Huseby states that  
 
“the survey data on the relationship between evaluations of government 
performance and political support is incapable of establishing the direction of 
causality. It is uncertain whether citizens give negative responses to 
questions on government performance because they do not trust the 
government, or if they loose faith in government because they evaluate the 
economic performance as poor” [23]. 
 
Generalisation 
To describe this model, we should answer two questions: is the attitude towards 
government a generalised one or can it be differentiated, and if it is generalised, why 
and how then does it influence perceptions of the agencies. 
To establish the impact of perceptions of government in general on perceptions of 
government agencies, it is important to know to what extent there is generalisation. 
This question is related to the processes described in model 1 and 2. If citizens do 
not make the distinction between the different institutions, it becomes difficult to 
determine the independent influence of government services. The process of 
generalisation, or better the opposite of it, differentiation, is part of socialisation, and 
requires a leaning process [35]. Generalisation can therefore point at a lower level of 
political sophistication, or at a (deviant) form of socialisation, where people learn to 
see government as a monolithic bloc without any differentiation, making it thus easier 
to attribute it extremely good or bad characteristics. 
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A number of authors have noticed a process of generalisation. There seems to be a 
common factor behind the evaluations of all institutions that are related to 
‘government’ [6;15;20;22;36-38]. By generalisation, we mean that the attitude 
towards government refers to one amorphous unity. In most surveys, respondents 
are shown a list of institutions and they are asked how much trust they have in each 
institution separately (scale from 1-4, or 1-5). It turns out that not all of these trust 
opinions correlate perfectly, and that a number of clusters can be found in the list. 
Even though there are differences, trust in one institution often means trust in all 
institutions [39]. Some institutions however may have a determining impact on trust in 
government in general, such as parliament, the president etc. (see model 2). This 
would mean that there is just one perception of government, because people do not 
make conceptual distinctions. Even between some private and public services, very 
little difference can be found [40]. This observation could lead to the conclusion that 
government is approached as if it was one amorphous concept. There is however no 
agreement among researchers on this issue. The extreme viewpoint is Klingemann 
who states there is no generalisation, and that all depends on actual performance. If 
there are similarities, this is due to similar performance [41]. The performance 
hypothesis also takes this as an implicit assumption. If on the other hand people see 
government as one amorphous unity, it seems improbable that specific experiences 
with specific services will have a strong impact on the perception of ‘government’. 
Another remark is that the evaluation of government in general differs from the 
summation of evaluations of all agencies (not institutions) separately [42]. How 
government is differentiated or generalised is part of political culture: in the Anglo-
Saxon tradition, the state as such does not exist as a legal entity, but rather as 
‘government’ and ‘government departments’. Continental European traditions on the 
other hand do not consider the authority of the state a divisible or bargainable [43]. 
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Concerning satisfaction with urban services, Stipak states that there is 
generalisation, i.c. that specific attitudes are based on general evaluations, for 
instance because of lack of information and knowledge and because political objects 
are in many cases rather impalpable [44]. The Canadian Center for Management 
Development finds that indeed general attitudes towards government affect 
perceptions of service quality [45]. Therefore, belief system differentiation (meaning 
that less general evaluations are used) should occur more when respondents are 
better educated and politically more informed. Most examples on the process of 
generalisation come from research on political institutions and we will turn to this 
literature for further examples. Steen did research in the Baltic States and found 
there was more trust in newer institutions (because these were not burdened with a 
communist legacy, and because the population itself has recently asked itself for 
their founding). Institutions producing a symbolic and/or diffuse output (church, army, 
press…) enjoyed more trust as compared to those with a very specific output. This is 
probably because it is easier for people to have clear criteria to judge specific outputs 
and because the actual outputs have deteriorated (cf. bad economic situation). 
Finally, he found more trust in the leaders of institutions than in the institutions [46]. 
Hetherington finds that it is the level of political trust in general that influences trust in 
the president, and not so much trust in the president that influences political trust in 
general, while the opposite is true for the relation between trust in Congress and 
political trust in general. Research on stereotypes has found that feelings about the 
sum affect feelings about parts more than feelings about the parts affect the sum 
[47]. 
Comparable to differentiation between institutions is differentiation between different 
levels of government. Local or decentralised government is said to enjoy a more 
favourable image than central government, because the distance between citizen 
and government is smaller, and the frequency of contact higher. This implies that 
citizens would differentiate between local and central government. Uslaner however 
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finds that the degree of approval for president and Congress in the USA influences 
trust in both federal and state level, thereby refuting the claim that people trust those 
levels closest to them more. He concludes there is no differentiation between 
different levels of government, but just a general attitude of trust in government. 
Therefore, the problem of trust in government will not be solved by empowering other 
levels of government [20]. Glaser and Denhardt find that government is government 
regardless of level. Performance ratings of (US) federal and state government have a 
very strong influence on perceptions and evaluations of local government [48]. 
 
Culture of Distrust 
Distrust does not necessarily have an influence on the stability of the political system 
or the behaviour of the citizens. One possible explanation could therefore be that the 
attitudes of the citizens do not result from a personal negative attitude vis-à-vis 
government, but because expressing a negative attitude towards government is a 
fashion, prejudice or cultural element. Citrin states that the current Zeitgeist (in 1974) 
promotes anti-political rhetoric. He considers denigrating speech on politicians and 
institutions as ritualistic negativism, and does therefore not see any reason to be 
worried. He compared political distrust with the rhetoric used in a baseball game: 
everyone yells at the referee and accuses him of mistakes, while this rhetoric never 
threatens the game [49]. Distrust, and not trust, then becomes the basic attitude 
towards government, and there is certain social pressure to comply with this attitude. 
Sztompka speaks about a ‘culture of (dis)trust’:  
 
“When a culture of trust- or culture of distrust- appears, the people are 
constrained to exhibit trust or distrust in all their dealings, independent of 
individual convictions, and departures from such a cultural demand meet with 
a variety of sanctions” [50].  
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This culture of distrust phenomenon thus makes that people are negative towards 
government agencies, not because of the performance of these agencies, but 
because they are government agencies. For Fox,  
 
“Damn-gummint [damn government] is a conflated aggregation, the illogical 
and shifting mingling of perceptions, symbols, examples, and nonsequitur 
inferences. Consider that every customer has had a bad experience with 
some private enterprise. But ‘damn-bidness’ [business] is not a conflated 
aggregation in high circulation” [51]. 
 
Explanations for existing negative perceptions of government and the public 
administration are therefore no longer to be found in public administration or political 
science theories, but rather in very basic sociological theories, though these do not 
explain anything on the origins of these images. 
The spiral of silence hypothesis states that the perception of the distribution of public 
opinion influences the willingness to express one’s own opinion, because one does 
not want to isolate oneself by having a different opinion [52]. As long as the people 
think most people have a negative perception of government, they will express a 
negative perception themselves, even if this perception does not correspond to 
reality. Minority opinions thus become very difficult to express and are met with 
sanctions. If negative attitudes towards government would be a social mood or even 
a social norm, it becomes very difficult to restore trust in government. Expressing a 
negative attitude becomes compulsory. Communication theory and diffusion studies 
could perhaps explain the diffusion dynamics of distrust and negative experiences 
with government and suggest possible strategies for reverting this trend. Diffusion of 
(dis)trusting opinions could therefore be a key factor. Research on service delivery 
revealed that dissatisfied customers tell on average seven people about their 
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experience, while satisfied customers do not. This implies that a negative opinion is 
dispersed faster. Stories and myths about the administration should also not be 
underestimated: certain stories, call them ‘urban legends’ can have an important 
impact on opinions.  
 
These examples show that performance does not always matter when such a ‘culture 
of distrust’ comes into being. At that moment perceptions of government become 
theory- rather than data-driven [53]. Negative attitudes towards government seem to 
support themselves. Examples of good performance are just not noticed anymore, as 
is illustrated by this extract from an interview with a prominent Belgian politician, 
where he tells about a conversation he had with a citizen: 
 
“An old man from Antwerp addressed me about the square we were both 
looking at. The square had been renovated entirely, and had probably never 
looked better. The social housing bordering the square was finally renovated. 
I admit, the man’s neighbourhood had been forced to wait for a long time, but 
finally the entire neighbourhood was upgraded. The result could clearly be 
seen. Still, the entire argument of the man was one long lamentation, which 
he then finally summarised as ‘for us, they [=government] never do anything’” 
(own translation) [54]. 
 
This immediately illustrates why recent attention for government communication, 
public services marketing and for external accreditations and evaluations (as a 
source of opinion on the quality of the evaluated agency above suspicion) will not 
necessarily contribute to a more ‘objective’ observation of government performance. 
 22
 
MODEL 5: MODERATED REVERSED CAUSALITY 
 
The previous model is of course an extreme case (in order not to rebuff those 
committed to improving public sector performance we won’t use the term ‘ideal-
type’). Relying on the reversed causality model would deny citizens the possibility to 
evaluate agency-performance in an independent way. In most cases, a realistic, i.e. 
fact-driven, perception of the separate agencies remains possible. Customer surveys 
indeed show that citizens are able to assess the performance of public services in an 
objective way, without constantly referring to stereotypes. The impact of the 
government stereotype (e.g. culture of distrust) on service evaluations depends on 
the context in which this evaluation is made. 
The observation that people are very critical of government and its service delivery in 
everyday speech (e.g. gossip, discussions in pubs etc.), while this is not always 
reflected in trust- or customer satisfaction surveys, gives additional evidence for the 
presence of a social norm (we do not give any indication here of how this came into 
existence). Allports’ research on stereotypes states that people always choose 
groups and not persons as out-groups. The abstractness of groups allows for 
changing one’s attitude towards certain persons in that group. When one is faced 
with a fact that is not reconcilable with the stereotype, it is not necessary to alter the 
stereotype, but one can just attribute it to a difference of the specific person/fact [55].  
Goodsell found that citizens take a negative stand towards government as a whole, 
but when ‘government’ becomes more concrete in surveys, this negative attitude 
largely disappears [56].  
Another example could be the often-held conviction by politicians who complain that 
citizens want more and better performance, but are not willing to pay for it. It is true 
that a voice calling for more taxation is unheard of, but still more than half of the 
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respondents of a British survey state they would be willing to pay more taxes for 
better public services [16].  In fact, this symptom can be found practically 
everywhere: parents evaluate their children’s school as good, but are sceptical about 
the educational system. People evaluate their own family and (working)community as 
good, but they still think these societal institutes are disappearing [37]. Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse speak about Fenno’s paradox: in surveys, people are positive about 
specific members of Congress (i.c. their own member), but take a negative attitude 
towards Congress as an institute. One of the reasons they give for this is that people 
use other assessment standards [30].  
The abstract nature of government partly explains the abundance of public 
administration-related stereotypes. Katz et. al. mentioned that when people are 
asked what kind of agency they prefer to tackle certain problems, a public or a 
private, that they can choose between two modes of answering: the pragmatic and 
the ideological one [57]. Ideological answers would return the private agency as the 
preferred one, while chances for a public agency increase when giving a pragmatic 
answer is promoted or stimulated in a context that hinders stereotyping. Rumours 
only appear when the real facts are ambiguous or vague [58]. Instead of rumours, we 
could also speak about (administrative and government-related) ‘stories’ or urban 
legends. Beck Jørgensen analysed novels in which the main subject was the relation 
between citizens and administration (e.g. Kafka’s novel ‘The Castle’) [59]. The 
advantage of such an approach is that it also allows catching informal aspects of the 
relation, that it mainly deals with perceptions, and that it allows tracing evolutions 
because of the availability of older material. His analysis showed that these novels, 
when dealing with the alienation in the relation between government/administration 
and citizen, never refer to concrete activities, but to (perceived) objectives, 
consequences and context. 
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These observations have important consequences for the measurement of 
performance evaluations. It seems that very broad and general surveys will return 
answers reflecting the existing stereotypes. Only specific questions will return the 
desired result, but this then creates a danger for researchers’ biases in the answering 
patterns. Whereas the need for benchmarks mainly stressed the comparability of 
wording and scale-construction, this evidence suggests the focus should be on 
context as well. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This article has shown that the hopes for creating a more favourable image of 
government by stimulating public sector modernisation, as exemplified in better 
performance and more quality, are built on assumptions that are at least incomplete. 
When we want to know more on the relation between the evaluation of the quality of 
public service performance and evaluations of government in general, we have to 
focus on the object(s) of evaluation, the evaluation criteria, and on the causal 
processes in the evaluations. We have used these three foci to deconstruct the 
relation between public service performance and trust in government, and to develop 
a number of alternative models which show where the main issues of future research 
on this relation should be. The alternative models that have been presented show 
that: 
1. Citizens do not consider all public agencies as being public, and influence of 
these agencies' performance on evaluations of government can therefore not be 
taken for granted.' 
2. Some agencies or bodies may feature stronger in citizens’ image of 
government, which makes that government is not just a summation of agencies.  
3. Performance is not the only criterion citizens use to evaluate government. 
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4. Point 1-3 show that it is difficult to establish the precise impact of evaluations 
of specific agencies on citizens’ trust in government. This relation changes 
constantly and is subject to contextual elements.  
5. The direction of the causality is disputed. Why would it not be the general 
attitude towards government that influences the perception of agency 
performance?  
 
The models we have presented should thus be considered as a deconstruction of the 
performance-trust relation for methodological purposes, since to know more on this 
relation, it is not sufficient just to measure citizens’ evaluations of government 
performance and compare these to citizens’ trust in government.  
 
Increasing government legitimacy by modernising public services is therefore just a 
partial strategy, since actual performance is not equal to perceived performance, and 
because differences might exist in citizens’ minds on the definition and necessity of 
public service performance. A unilateral focus on performance will not be sufficient, 
since perceptions and definitions of performance are not only created in government-
citizen interactions, but also in everyday citizen-citizen relations. Restoring trust in 
government cannot just be based on a managerial action-plan but requires social 
engineering as well. The core question should therefore be how government can 
alter these perceptions and evaluation criteria in a way that is acceptable in a 
democratic society. 
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Figure 3 
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